DeepAI
Log In Sign Up

Paradoxes in Sequential Voting

07/11/2018
by   Oren Dean, et al.
0

We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We show that strategic voting in these voting procedures may lead to a very undesirable outcome: Condorcet winning alternative might be rejected, Condorcet losing alternative might be elected, and Pareto dominated alternative might be elected. These undesirable phenomena occur already with four alternatives and a small number of voters. For the case of three alternatives we present positive and negative results.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

07/22/2019

Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method

Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumption...
07/26/2017

Cognitive Hierarchy and Voting Manipulation

By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for ...
02/17/2022

Robust Sparse Voting

Many modern Internet applications, like content moderation and recommend...
05/30/2022

Fair and Fast Tie-Breaking for Voting

We introduce a notion of fairest tie-breaking for voting w.r.t. two wide...
03/12/2021

Phrase-Verified Voting: Verifiable Low-Tech Remote Boardroom Voting

We present Phrase-Verified Voting, a voter-verifiable remote voting syst...
06/18/2019

Cyber-Risks in Paper Voting

Considering a large number of vulnerabilities reported in the news and t...
05/19/2018

Predicting Strategic Voting Behavior with Poll Information

The question of how people vote strategically under uncertainty has attr...