Overstatement-Net-Equivalent Risk-Limiting Audit: ONEAudit

03/06/2023
by   Philip B. Stark, et al.
0

Card-level comparison risk-limiting audits (CLCAs) heretofore required a CVR for each cast card and a "link" identifying which CVR is for which card – which many voting systems cannot provide. Every set of CVRs that produces the same aggregate results overstates contest margins by the same amount: they are overstatement-net-equivalent (ONE). CLCAs can therefore use CVRs from the voting system for any number of cards and ONE CVRs for the rest. Ballot-polling RLAs are equivalent to CLCAs using ONE CVRs. CLCAs can be based on batch-level results (e.g., precinct subtotals) by constructing ONE CVRs for each batch. In contrast to batch-level comparison audits (BLCAs), this avoids tabulating batches manually and works even when reporting batches do not correspond to physically identifiable batches of cards. If the voting system can export linked CVRs for only some ballot cards, auditors can still use CLCA by constructing ONE CVRs for the rest of the cards from contest results or batch subtotals. This obviates the need for "hybrid" audits. This works for every social choice function for which there is a known RLA method, including IRV. Sample sizes for BPA and ONEAudit using contest totals are comparable. ONEAudit using batch subtotals has smaller sample sizes than ballot-polling when batches are much more homogeneous than the election overall. Sample sizes can be much smaller than for BLCA: A CLCA of the 2022 presidential election in California at risk limit 5 ballots statewide, if the reported results are accurate, compared to about 26,700 for BLCA. The 2022 Georgia audit tabulated >231,000 cards versus  1300 for ONEAudit. For data from a pilot hybrid RLA in Kalamazoo, MI, in 2018, ONEAudit gives a risk of  2 for SUITE, the method the pilot used.

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