Optimal Capacity Modification for Many-To-One Matching Problems

02/03/2023
by   Jiehua Chen, et al.
0

We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side consists of students and the other side of schools with capacity constraints. We study how to optimally increase the capacities of the schools so as to obtain a stable and perfect matching (i.e., every student is matched) or a matching that is stable and Pareto-efficient for the students. We consider two common optimality criteria, one aiming to minimize the sum of capacity increases of all schools (abbrv. as MinSum) and the other aiming to minimize the maximum capacity increase of any school (abbrv. as MinMax). We obtain a complete picture in terms of computational complexity: Except for stable and perfect matchings using the MinMax criteria which is polynomial-time solvable, all three remaining problems are NP-hard. We further investigate the parameterized complexity and approximability and find that achieving stable and Pareto-efficient matchings via minimal capacity increases is much harder than achieving stable and perfect matchings.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
07/08/2021

Pareto optimal and popular house allocation with lower and upper quotas

In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are give...
research
01/27/2020

Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affirmative Action is beyond NP

We investigate the following many-to-one stable matching problem with di...
research
02/11/2022

Strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences

In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple par...
research
07/05/2022

Online 2-stage Stable Matching

We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situat...
research
08/27/2018

The Complexity of Student-Project-Resource Matching-Allocation Problems

In this technical note, I settle the computational complexity of nonwast...
research
11/24/2020

Fractional Matchings under Preferences: Stability and Optimality

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage...
research
09/24/2009

Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to w...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset