Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents
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We consider the problem of optimizing the placement of stubborn agents in a social network in order to maximally impact population opinions. We assume individuals in a directed social network each have a latent opinion that evolves over time in response to social media posts by their neighbors. The individuals randomly communicate noisy versions of their latent opinion to their neighbors. Each individual updates his opinion using a time-varying update rule that has him become more stubborn with time and be less affected by new posts. The dynamic update rule is a novel component of our model and reflects realistic behaviors observed in many psychological studies. We show that in the presence of stubborn agents with immutable opinions and under fairly general conditions on the stubbornness rate of the individuals, the opinions converge to an equilibrium determined by a linear system. We give an interesting electrical network interpretation of the equilibrium. We also use this equilibrium to present a simple closed form expression for harmonic influence centrality, which is a function that quantifies how much a node can affect the mean opinion in a network. We develop a discrete optimization formulation for the problem of maximally shifting opinions in a network by targeting nodes with stubborn agents. We show that this is an optimization problem with a monotone and submodular objective, allowing us to utilize a greedy algorithm. Finally, we show that a small number of stubborn agents can non-trivially influence a large population using simulated networks.
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