Online Bidding in Repeated Non-Truthful Auctions under Budget and ROI Constraints
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Online advertising platforms typically use auction mechanisms to allocate ad placements. Advertisers participate in a series of repeated auctions, and must select bids that will maximize their overall rewards while adhering to certain constraints. We focus on the scenario in which the advertiser has budget and return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. We investigate the problem of budget- and ROI-constrained bidding in repeated non-truthful auctions, such as first-price auctions, and present a best-of-both-worlds framework with no-regret guarantees under both stochastic and adversarial inputs. By utilizing the notion of interval regret, we demonstrate that our framework does not require knowledge of specific parameters of the problem which could be difficult to determine in practice. Our proof techniques can be applied to both the adversarial and stochastic cases with minimal modifications, thereby providing a unified perspective on the two problems. In the adversarial setting, we also show that it is possible to loosen the traditional requirement of having a strictly feasible solution to the offline optimization problem at each round.
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