On the Intriguing Connections of Regularization, Input Gradients and Transferability of Evasion and Poisoning Attacks
share
Transferability captures the ability of an attack against a machine-learning model to be effective against a different, potentially unknown, model. Studying transferability of attacks has gained interest in the last years due to the deployment of cyber-attack detection services based on machine learning. For these applications of machine learning, service providers avoid disclosing information about their machine-learning algorithms. As a result, attackers trying to bypass detection are forced to craft their attacks against a surrogate model instead of the actual target model used by the service. While previous work has shown that finding test-time transferable attack samples is possible, it is not well understood how an attacker may construct adversarial examples that are likely to transfer against different models, in particular in the case of training-time poisoning attacks. In this paper, we present the first empirical analysis aimed to investigate the transferability of both test-time evasion and training-time poisoning attacks. We provide a unifying, formal definition of transferability of such attacks and show how it relates to the input gradients of the surrogate and of the target classification models. We assess to which extent some of the most well-known machine-learning systems are vulnerable to transfer attacks, and explain why such attacks succeed (or not) across different models. To this end, we leverage some interesting connections highlighted in this work among the adversarial vulnerability of machine-learning models, their regularization hyperparameters and input gradients.
READ FULL TEXT
