On self-play computation of equilibrium in poker

05/23/2018
by   Mikhail Goykhman, et al.
2

We compare performance of the genetic algorithm and the counterfactual regret minimization algorithm in computing the near-equilibrium strategies in the simplified poker games. We focus on the von Neumann poker and the simplified version of the Texas Hold'Em poker, and test outputs of the considered algorithms against analytical expressions defining the Nash equilibrium strategies. We comment on the performance of the studied algorithms against opponents deviating from equilibrium.

READ FULL TEXT

page 14

page 15

page 21

page 22

page 25

page 26

page 29

page 30

research
01/30/2020

Fictitious Play Outperforms Counterfactual Regret Minimization

We compare the performance of two popular iterative algorithms, fictitio...
research
08/06/2020

Solving imperfect-information games via exponential counterfactual regret minimization

Two agents' decision-making problems can be modeled as the game with two...
research
01/12/2022

Safe Equilibrium

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes ...
research
03/26/2021

Evolutionary Strategies with Analogy Partitions in p-guessing Games

In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, player...
research
03/26/2021

A Genetic Algorithm approach to Asymmetrical Blotto Games with Heterogeneous Valuations

Blotto Games are a popular model of multi-dimensional strategic resource...
research
03/21/2022

Fictitious Play with Maximin Initialization

Fictitious play has recently emerged as the most accurate scalable algor...
research
07/02/2018

Analysis and Optimization of Deep CounterfactualValue Networks

Recently a strong poker-playing algorithm called DeepStack was published...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset