DeepAI AI Chat
Log In Sign Up

On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location

by   Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, et al.

We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents that occupy nodes of a line graph, and have private approval preferences over two facilities. When the facilities are located at some nodes of the line, each agent derives a cost that is equal to her total distance from the facilities she approves. The goal is to decide where to locate the two facilities, so as to (a) incentivize the agents to truthfully report their preferences, and (b) achieve a good approximation of the minimum total (social) cost or the maximum cost among all agents. For both objectives, we design deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with approximation ratios that significantly outperform the state-of-the-art, and complement these results with (almost) tight lower bounds.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations

We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agen...

Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal prefer...

Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources

We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem wit...

Strategyproof Mechanisms For Group-Fair Facility Location Problems

Ensuring group fairness among groups of individuals in our society is de...

Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting...

Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with op...

Min-Max Tours for Task Allocation to Heterogeneous Agents

We consider a scenario consisting of a set of heterogeneous mobile agent...