
Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a mar...
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A dual approach for dynamic pricing in multidemand markets
Dynamic pricing schemes were introduced as an alternative to postedpric...
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Competitive Equilibria in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers:Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of lar...
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Latent Agents in Networks: Estimation and Pricing
We focus on a setting where agents in a social network consume a product...
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Towards Data Auctions with Externalities
The design of data markets has gained in importance as firms increasingl...
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Optimizationfriendly generic mechanisms without money
The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting ...
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When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?
A classical question in economics is whether complex, randomized selling...
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On Approximate Welfare and RevenueMaximizing Equilibria for SizeInterchangeable Bidders
In a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), all bidders are envyfree (EF), meaning that their allocation maximizes their utility; and the market clears (MC), meaning that the price of unallocated goods is zero. EF is desirable to ensure the longterm viability of the market. MC ensures that demand meets supply. Any allocation that is part of a WE is also welfaremaximizing; however, it need not be revenuemaximizing. Furthermore, WE need not exist, e.g., in markets where bidders have combinatorial valuations. The traditional approach to simultaneously addressing both existence and low revenue is to relax the MC condition and instead require the price of unallocated goods be some, positive reserve price. The resulting solution concept, known as EnvyFree Pricing (EFP), has been studied in some special cases, e.g., singleminded bidders. In this paper, we go one step further; we relax EF as well as MC. We propose a relaxation of the EF condition where only winners are envyfree, and further relax the MC condition so that unallocated goods are priced at least at the reserve. We call this new solution concept Restricted EnvyFree Pricing (REFP). We investigate what REFP entails for singleminded bidders, and show that for sizeinterchangeable bidders (a generalization of singleminded introduced in this paper) we can compute a REFP in polynomial time, given a fixed allocation. As in the study of EFP, we remain interested in maximizing seller revenue. Instead of computing an outcome that simultaneously yields an allocation and corresponding prices, one could first solve for an allocation that respects a reserve price, and then solve for a corresponding set of supporting prices, each one at least the reserve. This twostep process fails in the case of EFP since, given a fixed allocation, envyfree prices need not exist. However, restricted envyfree prices always exist...
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