Novel Integer Programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem

12/09/2020
by   Xenia Klimentova, et al.
0

Kidney exchange programs (KEP's) represent an additional possibility of transplant for patients suffering from end stage kidney disease. If a patient has a willing living donor with whom the patient is not compatible, the pair patient–donor can join a pool of incompatible pairs and, if compatibility between patient and donor in two our more pairs exists, organs can be exchanged between them. The problem can be modeled as an integer program that, in general, aims at finding the pairs that should be selected for transplant such that maximum number of transplants is performed. In this paper we consider that for each patient there may exist a preference order over the organs that he/she can receive, since a patient may be compatible with several donors but may have a better fit over some than over others. Under this setting, the aim is to find the maximum cardinality stable exchange, a solution where no blocking cycle exists. For this purpose we propose three novel integer programming models based on the well-known edge and cycle formulations. These formulations are adjusted for both finding stable and strongly stable exchanges under strict preferences and for the case when ties in preferences may exist. Furthermore, we study a situation when the stability requirement can be relaxed by addressing the trade-off between maximum cardinality versus number of blocking cycles allowed in a solution. The effectiveness of the proposed models is assessed through extensive computational experiments on a wide set of instances.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
12/06/2021

Indian Kidney Exchange Program: A Game Theoretic Perspective

We propose a ways in which Kidney exchange can be feasibly, economically...
research
12/19/2021

Parameterized Algorithms for Kidney Exchange

In kidney exchange programs, multiple patient-donor pairs each of whom a...
research
10/03/2017

Maximum Matchings in Graphs for Allocating Kidney Paired Donation

Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to...
research
06/06/2016

Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange

A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need o...
research
07/07/2020

The Stackelberg Kidney Exchange Problem is Σ_2^p-complete

We introduce the Stackelberg kidney exchange problem. In this problem, a...
research
05/25/2017

Operation Frames and Clubs in Kidney Exchange

A kidney exchange is a centrally-administered barter market where patien...
research
09/14/2021

Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes

To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donor...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset