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Nash equilibrium seeking under partial-decision information over directed communication networks

by   Mattia Bianchi, et al.

We consider the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario. Specifically, each agent can only receive information from some neighbors via a communication network, while its cost function depends on the strategies of possibly all agents. In particular, while the existing methods assume undirected or balanced communication, in this paper we allow for non-balanced, directed graphs. We propose a fully-distributed pseudo-gradient scheme, which is guaranteed to converge with linear rate to a Nash equilibrium, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping. Our algorithm requires global knowledge of the communication structure, namely of the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of the adjacency matrix and of a certain constant related to the graph connectivity. Therefore, we adapt the procedure to setups where the network is not known in advance, by computing the eigenvector online and by means of vanishing step sizes.


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