Multidefender Security Games
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Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems with only one defender, despite being part of a more complex system with multiple players. Furthermore, many real systems such as transportation networks and the power grid exhibit interdependencies between targets and, consequently, between decision makers jointly charged with protecting them. To understand such multidefender strategic interactions present in security, we investigate game theoretic models of security games with multiple defenders. Unlike most prior analysis, we focus on the situations in which each defender must protect multiple targets, so that even a single defender's best response decision is, in general, highly non-trivial. We start with an analytical investigation of multidefender security games with independent targets, offering an equilibrium and price-of-anarchy analysis of three models with increasing generality. In all models, we find that defenders have the incentive to over-protect targets, at times significantly. Additionally, in the simpler models, we find that the price of anarchy is unbounded, linearly increasing both in the number of defenders and the number of targets per defender. Considering interdependencies among targets, we develop a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation to compute a defender's best response, and make use of this formulation in approximating Nash equilibria of the game. We apply this approach towards computational strategic analysis of several models of networks representing interdependencies, including real-world power networks. Our analysis shows how network structure and the probability of failure spread determine the propensity of defenders to over- or under-invest in security.
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