Multi-votes Election Control by Selecting Rules

by   Fengbo Wang, et al.

We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as: education, hobby or the relationship of candidates, a voter may present different preferences for the same candidate set. Here, we consider a new model of election control that by assigning different rules to the votes from different layers, makes the special candidate p being the winner of the election (a rule can be assigned to different layers). Assuming a set of candidates C among a special candidate "p", a set of voters V, and t layers, each voter gives t votes over all candidates, one for each layer, a set of voting rules R, the task is to find an assignment of rules to each layer that p is acceptable for voters (possible winner of the election). Three models are considered (denoted as sum-model, max-model, and min-model) to measure the satisfaction of each voter. In this paper, we analyze the computational complexity of finding such a rule assignment, including classical complexity and parameterized complexity. It is interesting to find out that 1) it is NP-hard even if there are only two voters in the sum-model, or there are only two rules in sum-model and max-model; 2) it is intractable with the number of layers as parameter for all of three models; 3) even the satisfaction of each vote is set as dichotomous, 1 or 0, it remains hard to find out an acceptable rule assignment. Furthermore, we also get some other intractable and tractable results.


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