Mobility operator resource-pooling contract design to hedge against network disruptions
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Public transportation delays due to systematic failures have a major impact on network users. We propose designing capacity pooling contracts to facilitate horizontal cooperation among operators to mitigate those costs and improve service resilience. When two or more public transport providers agree upon sharing resources, the total transportation costs can be reduced due to added flexibility in the system. These operators may contribute capacity to be used in cost-effective routes owned by other operators. We formulate a two-stage stochastic model to determine the cost savings under different collaboration scenarios. We provide several solution methods: a deterministic equivalent problem, the L-shaped method, and sample average approximation. Coalitional stability under Shapley value, nucleolus, and tau-value are tested. The proposed model is applied to a regional multimodal network in the Randstad area of the Netherlands, for four operators, 80 origin-destination pairs, and over 1400 links where disruption data is available. Using the proposed method, we identify stable cost allocations among four operating agencies that could yield a 44 pooling contract in place.
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