Mobility Equity from a Game-Theoretic Perspective
In this letter, we consider a multi-modal mobility system of travelers, and propose a game-theoretic framework to efficiently assign each traveler to a mobility service (e.g., different modes of transportation). Our focus in this framework is to maximize the "mobility equity" in the sense of respecting the mobility budgets of the travelers. Each traveler seeks to travel using only one service (e.g., car, bus, train, bike). The services are capacitated and can serve up to a fixed number of travelers at any instant of time. Thus, our problem falls under the category of many-to-one assignment problems, where the goal is to find the conditions that guarantee the stability of assignments. We formulate a linear program of maximizing the mobility equity of travelers and we fully characterize the optimal solution. We also show that our framework under the proposed pricing scheme induces truthfulness from the strategic travelers, while they have incentives to voluntarily participate under informational asymmetry.
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