Maximizing Social Welfare in Selfish Multi-Modal Routing using Strategic Information Design for Quantal Response Travelers
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Traditional selfish routing literature quantifies inefficiency in transportation systems with single-attribute costs using price-of-anarchy (PoA), and provides various technical approaches (e.g. marginal cost pricing) to improve PoA of the overall network. Unfortunately, practical transportation systems have dynamic, multi-attribute costs and the state-of-the-art technical approaches proposed in the literature are infeasible for practical deployment. In this paper, we offer a paradigm shift to selfish routing via characterizing idiosyncratic, multi-attribute costs at boundedly-rational travelers, as well as improving network efficiency using strategic information design. Specifically, we model the interaction between the system and travelers as a Stackelberg game, where travelers adopt multi-attribute logit responses. We model the strategic information design as an optimization problem, and develop a novel approximate algorithm to steer Logit Response travelers towards social welfare using strategic Information design (in short, LoRI). We demonstrate the performance of LoRI on a Wheatstone network with multi-modal route choices at the travelers. In our simulation experiments, we find that LoRI outperforms SSSP in terms of system utility, especially when there is a motive mismatch between the two systems and improves social welfare. For instance, we find that LoRI persuades a traveler towards a socially optimal route for 66.66 time on average, when compared to SSSP, when the system has 0.3 weight on carbon emissions. However, we also present a tradeoff between system performance and runtime in our simulation results.
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