DeepAI AI Chat
Log In Sign Up

Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

by   Maria Pini, et al.
Università di Padova

The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules

Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively elim...

Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote

For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulatio...

An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of mult...

Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting

Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in ...

Relation-algebraic and Tool-supported Control of Condorcet Voting

We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on ...

Where are the really hard manipulation problems? The phase transition in manipulating the veto rule

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Man...

Optimal Capacity Modification for Many-To-One Matching Problems

We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side consists of st...