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Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching

by   Ata Atay, et al.
Universitat de Barcelona
Université catholique de Louvain

We consider priority-based matching problems with limited farsightedness. We show that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of the TTC matching is a horizon-k vNM stable set if the degree of farsightedness is greater than three times the number of agents in the largest cycle of the TTC. On the contrary, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm may not belong to any horizon-k vNM stable set for k large enough.


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