Learning to Bid in Contextual First Price Auctions
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In this paper, we investigate the problem about how to bid in repeated contextual first price auctions. We consider a single bidder (learner) who repeatedly bids in the first price auctions: at each time t, the learner observes a context x_t∈ℝ^d and decides the bid based on historical information and x_t. We assume a structured linear model of the maximum bid of all the others m_t = α_0· x_t + z_t, where α_0∈ℝ^d is unknown to the learner and z_t is randomly sampled from a noise distribution ℱ with log-concave density function f. We consider both binary feedback (the learner can only observe whether she wins or not) and full information feedback (the learner can observe m_t) at the end of each time t. For binary feedback, when the noise distribution ℱ is known, we propose a bidding algorithm, by using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method to achieve at most O(√(log(d) T)) regret. Moreover, we generalize this algorithm to the setting with binary feedback and the noise distribution is unknown but belongs to a parametrized family of distributions. For the full information feedback with unknown noise distribution, we provide an algorithm that achieves regret at most O(√(dT)). Our approach combines an estimator for log-concave density functions and then MLE method to learn the noise distribution ℱ and linear weight α_0 simultaneously. We also provide a lower bound result such that any bidding policy in a broad class must achieve regret at least Ω(√(T)), even when the learner receives the full information feedback and ℱ is known.
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