Learning Generalizable Risk-Sensitive Policies to Coordinate in Decentralized Multi-Agent General-Sum Games
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While various multi-agent reinforcement learning methods have been proposed in cooperative settings, few works investigate how self-interested learning agents achieve mutual coordination in decentralized general-sum games and generalize pre-trained policies to non-cooperative opponents during execution. In this paper, we present a generalizable and sample efficient algorithm for multi-agent coordination in decentralized general-sum games without any access to other agents' rewards or observations. Specifically, we first learn the distributions over the return of individuals and estimate a dynamic risk-seeking bonus to encourage agents to discover risky coordination strategies. Furthermore, to avoid overfitting opponents' coordination strategies during training, we propose an auxiliary opponent modeling task so that agents can infer their opponents' type and dynamically alter corresponding strategies during execution. Empirically, we show that agents trained via our method can achieve mutual coordination during training and avoid being exploited by non-cooperative opponents during execution, which outperforms other baseline methods and reaches the state-of-the-art.
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