Learn to Predict Equilibria via Fixed Point Networks
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Systems of interacting agents can often be modeled as contextual games, where the context encodes additional information, beyond the control of any agent (e.g. weather for traffic and fiscal policy for market economies). In such systems, the most likely outcome is given by a Nash equilibrium. In many practical settings, only game equilibria are observed, while the optimal parameters for a game model are unknown. This work introduces Nash Fixed Point Networks (N-FPNs), a class of implicit-depth neural networks that output Nash equilibria of contextual games. The N-FPN architecture fuses data-driven modeling with provided constraints. Given equilibrium observations of a contextual game, N-FPN parameters are learnt to predict equilibria outcomes given only the context. We present an end-to-end training scheme for N-FPNs that is simple and memory efficient to implement with existing autodifferentiation tools. N-FPNs also exploit a novel constraint decoupling scheme to avoid costly projections. Provided numerical examples show the efficacy of N-FPNs on atomic and non-atomic games (e.g. traffic routing).
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