Keyword-Based Delegable Proofs of Storage
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Cloud users (clients) with limited storage capacity at their end can outsource bulk data to the cloud storage server. A client can later access her data by downloading the required data files. However, a large fraction of the data files the client outsources to the server is often archival in nature that the client uses for backup purposes and accesses less frequently. An untrusted server can thus delete some of these archival data files in order to save some space (and allocate the same to other clients) without being detected by the client (data owner). Proofs of storage enable the client to audit her data files uploaded to the server in order to ensure the integrity of those files. In this work, we introduce one type of (selective) proofs of storage that we call keyword-based delegable proofs of storage, where the client wants to audit all her data files containing a specific keyword (e.g., "important"). Moreover, it satisfies the notion of public verifiability where the client can delegate the auditing task to a third-party auditor who audits the set of files corresponding to the keyword on behalf of the client. We formally define the security of a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol. We construct such a protocol based on an existing proof-of-storage scheme and analyze the security of our protocol. We argue that the techniques we use can be applied atop any existing publicly verifiable proof-of-storage scheme for static data. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of our construction.
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