Inverse Cognitive Radar – A Revealed Preferences Approach
share
We consider an adversarial signal processing problem involving "us" versus an "enemy" cognitive radar. The enemy's cognitive radar observes our state in noise; uses a tracker to update its posterior distribution of our state and then chooses an action based on this posterior. Given knowledge of "our" state and the observed sequence of actions taken by the enemy's radar, we consider three problems: (i) Are the enemy radar's actions consistent with optimizing a monotone utility function (i.e., is the cognitive radar behavior rational in an economics sense). If so how can we estimate the adversary's cognitive radar's utility function that is consistent with its actions. (ii) How to construct a statistical detection test for utility maximization when we observe the enemy radar's actions in noise? (iii) How can we optimally probe the enemy's radar by choosing our state to minimize the Type 2 error of detecting if the radar is deploying an economic rational strategy, subject to a constraint on the Type 1 detection error? "Our" state can be viewed as a probe signal which causes the enemy's radar to act; so choosing the optimal state sequence is an input design problem. The main analysis framework used in this paper is that of revealed preferences from microeconomics.
READ FULL TEXT
