Interlude: Balancing Chaos And Harmony For Fair and Fast Blockchains

09/21/2022
by   Anurag Jain, et al.
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Blockchains lie at the heart of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies that have shown great promise to revolutionize finance and commerce. Although they are gaining increasing popularity, they face technical challenges when it comes to scaling to support greater demand while maintaining their desirable security properties. In an exciting line of recent work, many researchers have proposed various scalable blockchain protocols that demonstrate the potential to solve these challenges. However, many of these protocols come with the assumptions of honest majority and symmetric network access which may not accurately reflect the real world where the participants may be self-interested or rational. Secondly, these works show that their protocol works in an ideal environment where each party has equal access to the network whereas different parties have varying latencies and network speeds. These assumptions may render the protocols susceptible to security threats in the real world, as highlighted by the literature focused on exploring game-theoretic attacks on these protocols. We propose a scalable blockchain protocol, Interlude, which comes with the typical security guarantees while focusing on game-theoretic soundness and network fairness. The novelty of Interlude is that it has a relatively simple design consisting of a sequence of parallel blocks containing disjoint transaction sets that can be mined quickly followed by a series block that is slow to mine and gives the honest parties in the network time to synchronize. Thus, between the chaos of parallel blocks, our blockchain protocol masquerades an interlude moment of harmony in series blocks that synchronize the network.

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