Individually Rational Land and Neighbor Allocation: Impossibility Results

06/06/2021
by   Haris Aziz, et al.
0

We consider a setting in which agents are allocated land plots and they have additive preferences over which plot they get and who their neighbor is. Strategyproofness, Pareto optimality, and individual rationality are three fundamental properties in economic design. We present two impossibility results showing that the three properties are incompatible in this context.

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