Improving Quantal Cognitive Hierarchy Model Through Iterative Population Learning
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In domains where agents interact strategically, game theory is applied widely to predict how agents would behave. However, game-theoretic predictions are based on the assumption that agents are fully rational and believe in equilibrium plays, which unfortunately are mostly not true when human decision makers are involved. To address this limitation, a number of behavioral game-theoretic models are defined to account for the limited rationality of human decision makers. The "quantal cognitive hierarchy" (QCH) model, which is one of the more recent models, is demonstrated to be the state-of-art model for predicting human behaviors in normal-form games. The QCH model assumes that agents in games can be both non-strategic (level-0) and strategic (level-k). For level-0 agents, they choose their strategies irrespective of other agents. For level-k agents, they assume that other agents would be behaving at levels less than k and best respond against them. However, an important assumption of the QCH model is that the distribution of agents' levels follows a Poisson distribution. In this paper, we relax this assumption and design a learning-based method at the population level to iteratively estimate the empirical distribution of agents' reasoning levels. By using a real-world dataset from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer game, we demonstrate how our refined QCH model and the iterative solution-seeking process can be used in providing a more accurate behavioral model for agents. This leads to better performance in fitting the real data and allows us to track an agent's progress in learning to play strategically over multiple rounds.
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