Improved Activation Clipping for Universal Backdoor Mitigation and Test-Time Detection
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Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks (Trojans), where an attacker poisons the training set with backdoor triggers so that the neural network learns to classify test-time triggers to the attacker's designated target class. Recent work shows that backdoor poisoning induces over-fitting (abnormally large activations) in the attacked model, which motivates a general, post-training clipping method for backdoor mitigation, i.e., with bounds on internal-layer activations learned using a small set of clean samples. We devise a new such approach, choosing the activation bounds to explicitly limit classification margins. This method gives superior performance against peer methods for CIFAR-10 image classification. We also show that this method has strong robustness against adaptive attacks, X2X attacks, and on different datasets. Finally, we demonstrate a method extension for test-time detection and correction based on the output differences between the original and activation-bounded networks. The code of our method is online available.
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