How does uncertainty about other voters determine a strategic vote?

09/27/2018
by   Zeinab Bakhtiari, et al.
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We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium, and dominance, under uncertainty. We provide scenarios wherein the profile of true preferences is the same but the equilibrium profiles are different, because the voters have different knowledge about other voters. We also model actions that change such uncertainty about preferences, such as a voter revealing her preference. We show that some forms of manipulation and equilibrium are preserved under such uncertainty updates and others not. We then formalize epistemic voting terminology in a logic. Our aim is to provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting rules that incorporate uncertainty.

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