1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks have achieved state of the art performance in several Computer Vision tasks
[He et al.2016, Krizhevsky et al.2012]. However, recently it has been shown to be extremely vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. These small, carefully calibrated perturbations when added to the input lead to a significant change in the network’s prediction [Szegedy et al.2014]. The existence of adversarial examples pose a severe security threat to the practical deployment of deep learning models, particularly, in safetycritical systems
[Akhtar and Mian2018].Since the advent of adversarial perturbations, there has been extensive work in the area of crafting new adversarial attacks [Madry et al.2018, MoosaviDezfooli et al.2017, Carlini and Wagner2017b]. At the same time, several methods have been proposed to protect models from these attacks (adversarial defense)[Goodfellow et al.2015, Madry et al.2018, Tramèr et al.2018]. Nonetheless, many of these defense strategies are continually defeated by new attacks. [Athalye et al.2018, Carlini and Wagner2017a, Madry et al.2018]. In order to better compare the defense strategies, recent methods try to provide robustness guarantees by formally proving that no perturbation smaller than a given bound can fool their network [Raghunathan et al.2018, Tsuzuku et al.2018, Weng et al.2018, Carlini et al.2017, Wong and Kolter2018]. Also some work has been done by using the Lipschitz constant as a measure of robustness and improving upon it [Szegedy et al.2014, Cisse et al.2017, Tsuzuku et al.2018].
Despite the efforts, the adversarial defense methods still fail to provide a significant robustness guarantee for appropriate bounds (in terms of accuracy over adversarial examples) for large datasets like CIFAR10, CIFAR100, ImageNet[Russakovsky et al.2015]. Enhancing the robustness of models for these datasets is still an open challenge.
In this paper, we analyze the models trained using an adversarial defense methodology [Madry et al.2018] and find that while these models show robustness at the input layer, the latent layers are still highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks as shown in Fig 1. We utilize this property to introduce a new technique (LAT) of further finetuning the adversarially trained model. We find that improving the robustness of the models at the latent layer boosts the adversarial accuracy of the entire model. We observe that LAT improves the adversarial robustness by () and test accuracy by () for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets.
Our main contributions in this paper are the following:

We study the robustness of latent layers of networks in terms of adversarial accuracy and Lipschitz constant and observe that latent layers of adversarially trained models are still highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.

We propose a Latent Adversarial Training (LAT) technique that significantly increases the robustness of existing state of the art adversarially trained models[Madry et al.2018] for MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN and Restricted ImageNet datasets.

We propose Latent Attack (LA), a new adversarial attack that is comparable in terms of performance to PGD on multiple datasets. The attack exploits the nonrobustness of inbetween layers of existing robust models to construct adversarial perturbations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review various adversarial attack and defense methodologies. In Section 3 and 4.1, we analyze the vulnerability of latent layers in robust models and introduce our proposed training technique of Latent Adversarial Training (LAT). In Section 4.2 we describe our adversarial attack algorithm Latent Attack (LA). Further, we do some ablation studies to understand the effect of the choice of the layer on LAT and LA attack in Section 5.
2 Background And Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
For a classification network , let be its parameters, be the true class of  dimensional input and
be the loss function. The aim of an adversarial attack is to find the minimum perturbation
in that results in the change of class prediction. Formally,(1)  
s.t 
It can be expressed as an optimization problem as:
In general, the magnitude of adversarial perturbation is constrained by a norm where
to ensure that the perturbed example is close to the original sample. Various other constraints for closeness and visual similarity
[Xiao et al.2018] have also been proposed for the construction of adversarial perturbation .There are broadly two type of adversarial attacks: White box and Black box attacks. White box attacks assume complete access to the network parameters while in the latter there is no information available about network architecture or parameters. We briefly describe PGD[Madry et al.2018] adversarial attack which we use as a baseline in our paper.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack
Projected gradient descent [Madry et al.2018] is an iterative variant of Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)[Goodfellow et al.2015]. Adversarial examples are constructed by iteratively applying FGSM and projecting the perturbed output to a valid constrained space . The attack formulation is as follows:
(2) 
where denotes the perturbed sample at iteration.
While there has been extensive work in this area[Yuan et al.2019, Akhtar and Mian2018], we primarily focus our attention towards attacks which utilizes latent layer representation. [Sabour et al.2016] proposed a method to construct adversarial perturbation by manipulating the latent layer of different classes. However, Latent Attack (LA) exploits the adversarial vulnerability of the latent layers to compute adversarial perturbations.
2.2 Adversarial Defense
Popular defense strategies to improve the robustness of deep networks include the use of regularizers inspired by reducing the Lipschitz constant of the neural network [Tsuzuku et al.2018, Cisse et al.2017]. There have also been several methods which turn to GAN’s[Samangouei et al.2018]
for classifying the input as an adversary. However, these defense techniques were shown to be ineffective to adaptive adversarial attacks
[Athalye et al.2018, Logan Engstrom2018]. Hence we turn to adversarial training which [Goodfellow et al.2015, Madry et al.2018, Kannan et al.2018] is a defense technique that injects adversarial examples in the training batch at every step of the training. Adversarial training constitutes the current stateoftheart in adversarial robustness against whitebox attacks. For a comprehensive review of the work done in the area of adversarial examples, please refer [Yuan et al.2019, Akhtar and Mian2018].In our current work, we try to enhance the robustness of each latent layer, and hence increasing the robustness of the network as a whole. Previous works in this area include [Sankaranarayanan et al.2018, Cihang Xie2019]. However, our paper is different from them on the following counts:

[Cihang Xie2019] observes that the adversarial perturbation on image leads to noisy features in latent layers. Inspired by this observation, they develop a new network architecture that comprises of denoising blocks at the feature layer which aims at increasing the adversarial robustness. However, we are leveraging the observation of low robustness at feature layer to perform adversarial training for latent layers to achieve higher robustness.

[Sankaranarayanan et al.2018] proposes an approach to regularize deep neural networks by perturbing intermediate layer activation. Their work has shown improvement in test accuracy over image classification tasks as well as minor improvement in adversarial robustness with respect to basic adversarial perturbation [Goodfellow et al.2015]. However, our work focuses on the vulnerability of latent layers to a small magnitude of adversarial perturbations. We have shown improvement in test accuracy and adversarial robustness with respect of state of the art attack [Madry et al.2018].
3 Robustness of Latent Layers
Mathematically, a deep neural network with layers and as output can be described as:
(3) 
Here denotes the function mapping layer to layer with weights and bias respectively. From Eq. 3, it is evident that can be written as a composition of two functions:
(4) 
We can study the behavior of at a slightly perturbed input by inspecting its Lipschitz constant, which is defined by a constant such that Eq. 5 holds for all .
(5) 
Having a lower Lipschitz constant ensures that function’s output at perturbed input is not significantly different. This further can be translated to higher adversarial robustness as it has been shown by [Cisse et al.2017, Tsuzuku et al.2018]. Moreover, if and are the Lipschitz constant of the subnetworks and , the Lipschitz constant of has an upper bound defined by the product of Lipschitz constant of and , i.e.
(6) 
So having robust subnetworks can result in higher adversarial robustness for the whole network . But the converse need not be true.
For each of the latent layers , we calculate an upper bound for the magnitude of perturbation() by observing the perturbation induced in latent layer for adversarial examples .For obtaining a sensible bound of the perturbation for the subnetwork , the following formula is used :
(7) 
Using this we compute the adversarial robustness of subnetworks using PGD attack as shown in Fig 1.
We now, briefly describe the network architecture used for each dataset. ^{1}^{1}1Code avaiable at: https://github.com/msingh27/LAT_adversarial_robustness

MNIST[Lecun et al.1989]: We use the network architecture as described in [Madry et al.2018]. The natural and adversarial trained model achieves a test accuracy of 99.17% and 98.4% respectively.

CIFAR10[Krizhevsky et al.2010]: We use the network architecture as in [Madry et al.2018]. The natural and adversarial trained model achieves a test accuracy of 95.01% and 87.25% respectively.

CIFAR100[Krizhevsky et al.2010]
: We use the same network architecture as used for CIFAR10 with the modification at the logit layer so that it can handle the number of classes in CIFAR100. The natural and adversarial trained model achieves a test accuracy of 78.07% and 60.38% respectively.

SVHN[Netzer et al.2011]: We use the same network architecture as used for CIFAR10. The adversarial trained model achieves a test accuracy of 91.13%.

Restricted Imagenet[Tsipras et al.2019]: The dataset consists of a subset of imagenet classes which have been grouped into 9 different classes. The model achieves a test accuracy of 91.65%.
For adversarial training, the examples are constructed using PGD adversarial perturbations[Madry et al.2018]. Also, we refer adversarial accuracy of a model as the accuracy over the adversarial examples generated using the testset of the dataset. Higher adversarial accuracy corresponds to a more adversarially robust model.
We observe that for adversarially trained models, the adversarial accuracies of the subnetworks are relatively less than that of the whole network as shown in Fig 1 and 3. The trend is consistent across all the different datasets. Note that layer depth, i.e. is relative in all the experiments and the sampled layers are distributed evenly across the model. Also, in all tests the deepest layer tested is the layer just before the logit layer. Layer 0 corresponds to the input layer of .
Fig 1 and 3 reveal that the subnetworks of an adversarially trained model are still vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. In general, it reduces with increasing depth. Though, a peculiar trend to observe is the increased robustness in the later layers of the network. The plots indicate that there is a scope of improvement in the adversarial robustness of different subnetworks. In the next section, we introduce our method that specifically targets at making robust. We find that this leads to a boost in the adversarial and test performance of the whole network as well.
To better understand the characteristics of subnetworks we do further analysis from the viewpoint of Lipschitz constant of the subnetworks. Since we are only concerned with the behavior of the function in the small neighborhood of input samples, we compute Lipschitz constant of the whole network and subnetworks using the local neighborhood of input samples i.e.
(8) 
where denotes the neighbourhood of . For computational reasons, inspired by [AlvarezMelis and Jaakkola2018], we approximate by adding noise to with epsilon as given in Eq. 7. We report the value averaged over complete test data for different datasets and models in Fig. 2. The plot reveals that while for the adversarially trained model, the Lipschitz value of is lower than that of the naturally trained model, there is no such pattern in the subnetworks . This observation again reinforces our hypothesis of the vulnerabilities of the different subnetworks against small perturbations.
4 Harnessing Latent Layers
4.1 Latent Adversarial Training (LAT)
In this section, we seek to increase the robustness of the deep neural network, . We propose Latent Adversarial training (LAT) wherein both and one of the subnetworks are adversarially trained. For adversarial training of , we use a bounded adversarial perturbation computed via the PGD attack at layer with appropriate bound as defined in Eq. 7.
We are using LAT as a finetuning technique which operates on a adversarially trained model to improve its adversarial and test accuracy further. We observe that performing only a few epochs (
) of LAT on the adversarially trained model results in a significant improvement over adversarial accuracy of the model. Algorithm 1 describes our LAT training technique.To test the efficacy of LAT, we perform experiments over CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN, Rest. Imagenet and MNIST datasets. For fairness, we also compare our approach (LAT) against two baseline finetuning techniques.

Adversarial Training (AT) [Madry et al.2018]

Feature Noise Training (FNT) using algorithm 1 with gaussian noise to perturb the latent layer .
Table 1 reports the adversarial accuracy corresponding to LAT and baseline finetuning methods over the different datatsets. PGD Baseline corresponds to 10 steps for CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN, 40 steps for MNIST and 8 steps of PGD attack for Restricted Imagenet. We perform 2 epochs of finetuning for MNIST, CIFAR10, Rest. Imagenet, 1 epoch for SVHN and 5 epochs for CIFAR100 using the different techniques. The results are calculated with the constraint on the maximum amount of perpixel perturbation as for MNIST dataset and for CIFAR10, CIFAR100, Restricted ImageNet and SVHN.
Adversarial Accuracy  
Dataset 



Test Acc.  
CIFAR10  AT  47.12 %  46.19 %  87.27 %  
FNT  46.99 %  46.41 %  87.31 %  
LAT  53.84 %  53.04 %  87.80 %  
CIFAR100 
AT  22.72 %  22.21 %  60.38 %  
FNT  22.44 %  21.86 %  60.27 %  
LAT  27.03 %  26.41 %  60.94 %  
SVHN 
AT  54.58 %  53.52 %  91.88 %  
FNT  54.69 %  53.96 %  92.45 %  
LAT  60.23 %  59.97 %  91.65 %  
Rest. 
AT  17.52 %  16.04%  91.83 %  
ImageNet  FNT  18.81 %  17.32 %  91.59 %  
LAT  22.00 %  20.11 %  89.86 %  
MNIST 
AT  93.75 %  92.92%  98.40 %  
FNT  93.59 %  92.16 %  98.28 %  
LAT  94.21 %  93.31 %  98.38 %  

The results in the Table 1 correspond to the best performing layers ^{2}^{2}2The results correspond to , , , and subnetworks for the CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100, Rest. Imagenet and MNIST datasets respectively.. As can be seen from the table, that only after 2 epochs of training by LAT on CIFAR10 dataset, the adversarial accuracy jumps by . Importantly, LAT not only improves the performance of the model over the adversarial examples but also over the clean test samples, which is reflected by an improvement of 0.6% in test accuracy. A similar trend is visible for SVHN and CIFAR100 datasets where LAT improves the adversarial accuracy by 8% and 4% respectively, as well as the test accuracy for CIFAR100 by 0.6% . Table 1 also reveals that the two baseline methods do not lead to any significant changes in the performance of the model. As the adversarial accuracy of the adversarially trained model for the MNIST dataset is already high (93.75%), our approach does not lead to significant improvements ().
To analyze the effect of LAT on latent layers, we compute the robustness of various subnetworks of after training using LAT. Fig 1 shows the robustness of different subnetwork with and without our LAT method for CIFAR10 and MNIST datasets. Figure 3 contains the results for CIFAR100 dataset. As the plots show, our approach not only improves the robustness of but also that of most of the subnetworks . A detailed analysis analyzing the effect of the choice of the layer and the hyperparameter of LAT on the adversarial robustness of the model is shown in section 5.
4.2 Latent Adversarial Attack (LA)
In this section, we seek to leverage the vulnerability of latent layers of a neural network to construct adversarial perturbations. In general, existing adversarial perturbation calculation methods like FGSM [Goodfellow et al.2015] and PGD [Madry et al.2018] operate by directly perturbing the input layer to optimize the objective that promotes misclassification. In our approach, for given input example and a subnetwork , we first calculate adversarial perturbation constrained by appropriate bounds where . Here,
(9)  
Subsequently, we optimize the following equation to obtain for LA :
(10) 
We repeat the above two optimization steps iteratively to obtain our adversarial perturbation.
For the comparison of the performance of LA, we use PGD adversarial perturbation as a baseline attack. In general, we obtain better or comparable adversarial accuracy when compared to PGD attack. We use the same configuration for as in LAT. For MNIST and CIFAR100, our LA achieves an adversarial accuracy of and respectively whereas PGD(100 steps) and PGD(10 steps) obtains adversarial accuracy of and respectively. In the case of CIFAR10 dataset, LA achieves adversarial accuracy of and PGD(10 steps) obtains adversarial accuracy of . The represented LA attacks are from the best layers, i.e., for MNIST, CIFAR100 and for CIFAR10.
Some of the adversarial examples generated using LA is illustrated in Fig 5. The pseudo code of the proposed algorithm(LA)is given in Algo 2.
begin
Output: Adversarial example = for do
for do
for do
5 Discussion and Ablation Studies
To gain an understanding of LAT, we perform various experiments and analyze the findings in this section. We choose CIFAR10 as the primary dataset for all the following experiments.
Effect of layer depth in LAT.
We fix the value of to the best performing value of and finetune the model using LAT for different latent layers of the network. The left plot in Fig 4 shows the influence of the layer depth in the performance of the model. It can be observed from the plot, that the robustness of increases with increasing layer depth, but the trend reverses for the later layers. This observation can be explained from the plot in Fig 1, where the robustness of decreases with increasing layer depth , except for the last few layers.
Effect of hyperparameter in LAT.
We fix the layer depth to as it was the best performing layer for CIFAR10 and we perform LAT for different values of . This hyperparameter controls the ratio of weight assigned to the classification loss corresponding to adversarial examples for and the classification loss corresponding to adversarial examples for . The right plot in Fig 4 shows the result of this experiment. We find that the robustness of increases with increasing . However, the adversarial accuracy does start to saturate after a certain value. The performance of test accuracy also starts to suffer beyond this point.
Blackbox and whitebox attack robustness.
We test the black box and whitebox adversarial robustness of LAT finetuned model for the CIFAR10 dataset over various values. For evaluation in black box setting, we perform transfer attack from a secret adversarially trained model, bandit black box attack[Ilyas et al.2019] and SPSA[Uesato et al.2018]. Figure 7 shows the adversarial accuracy. As it can be seen, the LAT trained model achieves higher adversarial robustness for both the black box and whitebox attacks over a range of values when compared against baseline AT model. We also observe that the adversarial perturbations transfers better() from LAT model than AT models.
Performance of LAT with training steps.
Figure 6 plots the variation of test and adversarial accuracy while finetuning using the LAT and AT techniques.
Different attack methods used for LAT.
Rather than using a bound PGD adversarial attack, we also explored using a bound PGD attack and FGSM attack to perturb the latent layers in LAT. By using bound PGD attack in LAT for 2.5 epochs, the model achieves an adversarial and test accuracy of 88.02% and 53.46% respectively. Using FGSM to perform LAT did not lead to improvement as the model achieves 48.83% and 87.26% adversarial and test accuracy respectively. The results are calculated by choosing the subnetwork.
Random layer selection in LAT :
Previous experiments of LAT finetuning corresponds to selecting a single subnetwork and adversarially training it. We perform an experiment where at each training step of LAT we randomly choose one of the [, , , ] subnetworks to perform adversarial training. The model performs comparably, achieving a test and adversarial accuracy of and respectively.
6 Conclusion
We observe that deep neural network models trained via adversarial training have subnetworks vulnerable to adversarial perturbation. We described a latent adversarial training (LAT) technique aimed at improving the adversarial robustness of the subnetworks. We verified that using LAT significantly improved the adversarial robustness of the overall model for several different datasets along with an increment in test accuracy. We performed several experiments to analyze the effect of depth on LAT and showed higher robustness to BlackBox attacks. We proposed Latent Attack (LA) an adversarial attack algorithm that exploits the adversarial vulnerability of latent layer to construct adversarial examples. Our results show that the proposed methods that harness the effectiveness of latent layers in a neural network beat stateoftheart in defense methods, and offer a significant pathway for new developments in adversarial machine learning.
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