
On the Critical Difference of Almost Bipartite Graphs
A set S⊆ V is independent in a graph G=( V,E) if no two vertices from S...
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Dynamic Detection of False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid using Deep Learning
Modern advances in sensor, computing, and communication technologies ena...
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DataDriven False Data Injection Attacks Against Power Grid: A Random Matrix Approach
We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attack...
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Novel Attacks against Contingency Analysis in Power Grids
Contingency Analysis (CA) is a core component of the Energy Management S...
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Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing
Sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) endowed with GPS receive...
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Novel Stealthy Attack and Defense Strategies for Networked Control Systems
This paper studies novel attack and defense strategies, based on a class...
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Mind the Mining
In this paper we revisit the mining strategies in proof of work based cr...
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GraphTheoretic Framework for Unified Analysis of Observability and Data Injection Attacks in the Smart Grid
In this paper, a novel graphtheoretic framework is proposed to generalize the analysis of a broad set of security attacks, including observability and data injection attacks, that target the smart grid. First, the notion of observability attacks is defined based on a proposed graphtheoretic construct. In this respect, an algorithm is proposed to characterize the critical set of measurements which must be removed along with a certain measurement to make the system unobservable. It is then shown that for the system to be observable these critical sets must be part of a maximum matching over a proposed bipartite graph. In addition, it is shown that stealthy data injection attacks are a special case of these observability attacks. Then, various attack strategies and defense policies for observability and data injection attacks are shown to be amenable to analysis using variations of the formulated maximummatching problem. The proposed framework is then shown to provide a unified basis for exact analysis of four security problems (among others), pertaining to the characterization of: 1) The sparsest stealthy attack, 2) The sparsest stealthy attack including a certain specific measurement, 3) A set of measurements which must be defended to thwart all potential stealthy attacks, and 4) The set of measurements, which when protected, can thwart any attack whose cardinality is below a certain threshold. A case study using the IEEE 14bus system containing a set of 17 measurement units is used to corroborate the theoretical findings. In this case analysis, stealthy attacks of lowest cardinality are characterized and shown to have a cardinality equal to 2. In addition, it is shown that defending only 3 out of the 17 measurements is enough to thwart any stealthy attack with cardinality lower than 3, while defending a minimum of 13 measurements is needed to thwart all possible stealthy attacks.
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