Location History users
Differential Privacy 
Let be a positive real number and A be a randomized algorithm that computes a metric. In the context of this report, A is considered -differentially private if for all input datasets and that differ in one user’s contributions and for all subsets of :
The metrics are aggregated per day and per geographic area. There are three levels of geographic areas; in this paper, we call these granularity levels.
Granularity level 0 corresponds to metrics aggregated by country / region.
Granularity level 1 corresponds to metrics aggregated by top-level geopolitical subdivisions (e.g. US states).
Granularity level 2 corresponds to metrics aggregated by higher-resolution granularity (e.g. U.S. Counties).
Granularity levels 1 and 2 are defined differently in different countries, to account for knowledge of local public-health needs. Note that in general, the geographic area represented gets smaller as the Granularity number increases. No metrics are published for geographic regions smaller than 3km.
2 Generating anonymized metrics
We are releasing aggregated, anonymized data that is designed to ensure that no personal data, including an individual’s location, movement, or contacts, can be derived from the resulting metrics. To that end, we anonymize the statistics with differential privacy. We query the underlying data using our open-source differential privacy library, which adds Laplace noise  to protect each metric with differential privacy.
2.1 Daily visits in public places
We count the number of unique LH users who visited a public place of a given category in a given day at each granularity level. There are seven different categories derived from the data: retail, recreation, eateries (reported as part of “Retail & recreation”); groceries, pharmacies; transit; and parks. We add Laplace noise to each count according to the following table.
|Granularity level||Scale of Laplace noise||Corresponding parameter|
For each location (at all geographic levels), each LH user can contribute at most once to each category. We also bound the contribution of each LH user to 4 category,location pairs per day and per geographic level, using a process similar to the one described in this paper : if an LH user contributes to more than 4 pairs in a given day and given geographic level, we randomly select 4 of them, and discard the others.
For example, suppose that on the same day, an LH user goes to public places in all 7 categories in two distinct neighboring countries. This makes a total of 14 category,location pairs at country level. We would randomly discard 10 of these pairs when computing country-level statistics.
This process does not significantly affect data accuracy: in the US, at county level, of LH users contribute 3 or fewer category,place pairs per day on average. Thus, each daily place visit is protected by differential privacy with , and the total daily contribution of each user with a maximum of .
For the purposes of this analysis, we use signals like relative frequency, time and duration of visits to calculate metrics related to places of residence. We calculate an average amount of time spent at places of residence for LH users in hours. This computation is performed for each day and geographic area, using the differentially private mean mechanism from our open-source library . This mechanism works as follows:
We compute the amount of time spent at place of residence in a given day and geographic area in hours by summing up the individual values per user offset by 12, so all individual values fall into the range . We then add Laplace noise to this sum; the scale of the noise is indicated in the table below. We denote the real sum S, and noisy sum NS.
We compute the count of unique users who spent any time at residences in a given day and geographic area. We then add Laplace noise to this count; the scale of the noise is indicated in the table below. We refer to the real count C, and the noisy count NC.
Finally, we compute the ratio NS/NC for each day and each geographic area, add 12 as offset and clamp it to the range hours/day.
For example, at county-level, NS is obtained by first sampling a random number from a Laplace distribution of scale 109.1, and then adding that number to S. In the table below, we also indicate the standard deviationof the noise added to each value.
|Granularity level||Scale of Laplace noise:||Scale of Laplace noise:||Corresponding|
|sum (total hours/day)||count (number of users)||parameter|
Each user can contribute to at most one region per granularity level, which protects these metrics by differential privacy with total budget across all granularities. A description of the differentially private mean mechanism implemented and a proof of its privacy guarantees is described in  (Algorithm 2.4).
For the purposes of this analysis, we use signals like relative frequency, time and duration of visits to calculate metrics related to places of residence and places of work of LH users. We calculate how many LH users spent more than 1 hour at their places of work. This computation is performed for each day and geographic area. Then, we add Laplace noise to each count according to the following table.
|Geographic level||Scale of Laplace noise||Corresponding parameter|
The count is aggregated by places of residence of LH users. Since each user can contribute to at most one geographic area per granularity level, these metrics are protected by differential privacy with .
3 Generating the report from the anonymized metrics
The metrics described above are generated for each day, starting on 2020-01-01. They are then used to generate the percentage changes relative to day of the week published in the reports. All operations described below use only the output of the differentially private mechanisms described in the previous section; so they do not consume any privacy budget.
Additional privacy protections
We discard all metrics for which the geographic region is smaller than 3km, or for which the differentially private count of contributing users (after noise addition) is smaller than 100. Geographic regions smaller than 3km may be merged such that the union of their area is above the 3km threshold. This merging does not occur across country boundaries, except for the Vatican City and Italy.
3.1 Computing percentage changes from a baseline
For each individual metric generated using the mechanisms described above, we compute the ratio between the metric for a given day D and the same metric computed for the baseline period. The reference baseline is defined in the following way.
We consider the 5-week range from 2020-01-03 through 2020-02-06.
Within this 5-week range, we consider the 5 days with the same day of week as D. For example, if D is 2020-03-20, D is a Friday, so we consider the 5 Fridays in this 5-week range (Jan 3 to Jan 31, inclusive).
We compute the median of the differentially private metrics for these 5 baseline days.
This median metric is the baseline metric for D.
We then compute and publish the ratio between the metric for D and the baseline metric, as a percentage.
3.2 Removing unreliable metrics for Residential, Workplace, Transit, and Parks
In some regions, the noise added to obtain differential privacy can reduce the confidence that we are capturing a meaningful change, typically when there is not a lot of data for the metric. When, because of this uncertainty, the percentage change for one of these metrics has a chance (or higher) of being wrong by more than absolute percentage points, we do not publish it and instead include an asterisk denoting that there is not enough data available to present privacy-safe information. More precisely:
Before releasing a ratio metric/baseline, we compute confidence intervals for the metric and its baseline. Let us denote [metric_min, metric_max] and [baseline_min, baseline_max] these respective confidence intervals.
We compute the ratios metric_min/baseline_max and metric_max/baseline_min.
If one of these ratios differs from the differentially private ratio by more than 10 absolute percentage points, we do not publish the corresponding percentage changes.
If the last condition is not satisfied, then the probability of being wrong by more than 10 absolute percentage points in each direction is lower than 2.5%. By union bound, this means that there is at most a 5% risk of being wrong by more than 10 absolute percentage points. Note that the confidence intervals are based on an already differentially private value and on public data (the scale and shape of the noise), so no privacy budget is consumed by this operation.
-  Enabling developers and organizations to use differential privacy. https://developers.googleblog.com/2019/09/enabling-developers-and-organizations.html.
-  Location History. https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3118687?hl=en.
-  Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis. In TCC, volume 3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 265–284. Springer, 2006.
-  Google’s C++ Differential Privacy Library. https://github.com/google/differential-privacy.
-  Laplace Distribution. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace_distribution.
-  Royce Wilson, Celia Yuxin Zhang, William Lam, Damien Desfontaines, Daniel Simmons-Marengo, and Bryant Gipson. Differentially Private SQL with Bounded User Contribution. In To appear in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium 2020, 2020.
-  DP Library Bounded Mean. https://github.com/google/differential-privacy/blob/master/differential_privacy/algorithms/bounded-mean.h.
-  N. Li, M. Lyu, D. Su, and W. Yang. Differential Privacy: From Theory to Practice. Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2016.