Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme

09/30/2019
by   Mutaz Y. Melhem, et al.
0

A new attack against the Kirchhoff Law Johnson Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC voltage sources at both Alices and Bobs ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice's and Bob's terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
06/14/2018

A Static-Loop-Current Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange System

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribu...
research
04/03/2020

Man in the middle and current injection attacks against the KLJN key exchanger compromised by DC sources

This study addresses a new question regarding the security of the Kirchh...
research
05/22/2020

AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise(KLJN) secure key ex...
research
02/11/2023

Transient Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchanger

We demonstrate the security vulnerability of the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Joh...
research
10/11/2022

Current injection and voltage insertion attacks against the VMG-KLJN secure key exchanger

In this paper, the vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl (VMG)- ...
research
06/02/2022

A New Security Boundary of Component Differentially Challenged XOR PUFs Against Machine Learning Modeling Attacks

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are promising security primitives f...
research
01/17/2020

Low-Cost Anti-Copying 2D Barcode by Exploiting Channel Noise Characteristics

In this paper, for overcoming the drawbacks of the prior approaches, suc...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset