First Price Auction is 1 - 1/e^2 Efficient

07/05/2022
by   Yaonan Jin, et al.
0

We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1 - 1/e^2 ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

READ FULL TEXT
research
08/22/2022

Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World

We study the price of anarchy of the first-price auction in the autobidd...
research
05/26/2017

Dual Based DSP Bidding Strategy and its Application

In recent years, RTB(Real Time Bidding) becomes a popular online adverti...
research
12/20/2019

Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions

This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction w...
research
03/22/2022

Price Manipulability in First-Price Auctions

First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely ...
research
12/04/2019

A Low Computational Approach for Price Tag Recognition

In this work we discuss the task of search, localization and recognition...
research
05/24/2009

Swap Bribery

In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an...
research
06/30/2020

PriceAggregator: An Intelligent System for Hotel Price Fetching

This paper describes the hotel price aggregation system - PriceAggregato...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset