False Consensus, Information Theory, and Prediction Markets
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Our main result shows that when agents' private information about an event are independent conditioning on the event's outcome, then, after an initial announcement, whenever agents have similar beliefs about the outcome, their information is aggregated. That is, there is no false consensus. Our main result has a short proof based on a natural information theoretic framework. A key ingredient of the framework is the equivalence between the sign of the “interaction information” and a super/sub-additive property of the value of people's information. This provides an intuitive interpretation and an interesting application of the interaction information, which measures the amount of information shared by three random variables. We illustrate the power of this information theoretic framework by reproving two additional results within it: 1) that agents quickly agree when while announcing beliefs in round robin fashion [Aaronson 2005]; and 2) results from [Chen et al 2010] on when prediction market agents should release information to maximize their payment. We also interpret the information theoretic framework and the above results in prediction markets by proving that the expected reward of revealing information is the conditional mutual information of the information revealed.
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