Fairness in the Assignment Problem with Uncertain Priorities
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In the assignment problem, a set of items must be allocated to unit-demand agents who express ordinal preferences (rankings) over the items. In the assignment problem with priorities, agents with higher priority are entitled to their preferred goods with respect to lower priority agents. A priority can be naturally represented as a ranking and an uncertain priority as a distribution over rankings. For example, this models the problem of assigning student applicants to university seats or job applicants to job openings when the admitting body is uncertain about the true priority over applicants. This uncertainty can express the possibility of bias in the generation of the priority ranking. We believe we are the first to explicitly formulate and study the assignment problem with uncertain priorities. We introduce two natural notions of fairness in this problem: stochastic envy-freeness (SEF) and likelihood envy-freeness (LEF). We show that SEF and LEF are incompatible and that LEF is incompatible with ordinal efficiency. We describe two algorithms, Cycle Elimination (CE) and Unit-Time Eating (UTE) that satisfy ordinal efficiency (a form of ex-ante Pareto optimality) and SEF; the well known random serial dictatorship algorithm satisfies LEF and the weaker efficiency guarantee of ex-post Pareto optimality. We also show that CE satisfies a relaxation of LEF that we term 1-LEF which applies only to certain comparisons of priority, while UTE satisfies a version of proportional allocations with ranks. We conclude by demonstrating how a mediator can model a problem of school admission in the face of bias as an assignment problem with uncertain priority.
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