Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations

09/25/2020
by   Vasilis Gkatzelis, et al.
0

A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial guarantees in an adversarial setting is impossible. However, we show that normalizing the agent values, a very common assumption in fair division, allows us to escape this impossibility. Our main result is an online algorithm for the case of two agents that ensures the outcome is envy-free while guaranteeing 91.6 there is no envy-free algorithm that guarantees more than 93.3 social welfare.

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