Fair and Efficient Multi-Resource Allocation for Cloud Computing
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We study the problem of allocating multiple types of resources to agents with Leontief preferences. The classic Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) mechanism satisfies several desired fairness and incentive properties, but is known to have poor performance in terms of social welfare approximation ratio. In this work, we propose a new approximation ratio measure, called , which is defined as the worst-case ratio between the optimal social welfare (resp. utilization) among all fair allocations and that by the mechanism, allowing us to break the lower bound barrier under the classic approximation ratio. We then generalize DRF and present several new mechanisms with two and multiple types of resources that satisfy the same set of properties as DRF but with better social welfare and utilization guarantees under the new benchmark. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of these mechanisms through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets.
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