Exploration of Quantum Computer Power Side-Channels

04/06/2023
by   Chuanqi Xu, et al.
0

Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) quantum computers are being rapidly improved, with bigger numbers of qubits and improved fidelity. The rapidly increasing qubit counts and improving the fidelity of quantum computers will enable novel algorithms to be executed on the quantum computers, and generate novel results and data whose intellectual property will be a highly-guarded secret. At the same time, quantum computers are likely to remain specialized machines, and many will be controlled and maintained in a remote, cloud-based environment where end users who want to come up with novel algorithms have no control over the physical space. Lack of physical control by users means that physical attacks could be possible, by malicious insiders in the data center, for example. This work shows for the first time that power-based side-channel attacks could be deployed against quantum computers. The attacks could be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to quantum computers. From the control pulses, the gate level description of the circuits, and eventually the secret algorithms can be reverse engineered. This work demonstrates how and what information could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from power-based side-channels. Real control pulse information from real quantum computers is used to demonstrate potential power-based side-channel attacks. Meanwhile, proposed defenses can be deployed already today, without hardware changes.

READ FULL TEXT
research
03/05/2022

Towards an Antivirus for Quantum Computers

Researchers are today exploring models for cloud-based usage of quantum ...
research
09/11/2023

Classification of Quantum Computer Fault Injection Attacks

The rapid growth of interest in quantum computing has brought about the ...
research
09/12/2023

Extending and Defending Attacks on Reset Operations in Quantum Computers

The development of quantum computers has been advancing rapidly in recen...
research
01/18/2020

Your Noise, My Signal: Exploiting Switching Noise for Stealthy Data Exfiltration from Desktop Computers

Attacks based on power analysis have been long existing and studied, wit...
research
08/18/2021

Estimating distinguishability measures on quantum computers

The performance of a quantum information processing protocol is ultimate...
research
08/31/2023

HiSEP-Q: A Highly Scalable and Efficient Quantum Control Processor for Superconducting Qubits

Quantum computing promises an effective way to solve targeted problems t...
research
07/22/2019

Maya: Falsifying Power Sidechannels with Operating System Support

The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking thro...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset