Evolutionarily Stable Preferences Against Multiple Mutations

10/30/2018
by   Yu-Sung Tu, et al.
0

We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population settings, respectively. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and individuals are randomly matched to play an n-player strategic game. But their actual fitnesses are defined by material payoff functions. In the two population settings, respectively, we examine necessary and sufficient conditions for evolutionary stability against multiple mutations; we characterize the relations between the order of stability and the level of efficiency.

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