
Statistics with improper posteriors
In 1933 Kolmogorov constructed a general theory that defines the modern ...
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Tractability through Exchangeability: A New Perspective on Efficient Probabilistic Inference
Exchangeability is a central notion in statistics and probability theory...
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Conditional Utility, Utility Independence, and Utility Networks
We introduce a new interpretation of two related notions  conditional u...
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Improper posteriors are not improper
In 1933 Kolmogorov constructed a general theory that defines the modern ...
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Lp : A Logic for Statistical Information
This extended abstract presents a logic, called Lp, that is capable of r...
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Reasoning From Data in the Mathematical Theory of Evidence
Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) is known as a foundation for reaso...
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Conditional probability and improper priors
The purpose of this paper is to present a mathematical theory that can b...
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Evidential Confirmation as Transformed Probability
A considerable body of work in AI has been concerned with aggregating measures of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence for a common set of propositions. Claiming classical probability to be inadequate or inappropriate, several researchers have gone so far as to invent new formalisms and methods. We show how to represent two major such alternative approaches to evidential confirmation not only in terms of transformed (Bayesian) probability, but also in terms of each other. This unifies two of the leading approaches to confirmation theory, by showing that a revised MYCIN Certainty Factor method [12] is equivalent to a special case of DempsterShafer theory. It yields a wellunderstood axiomatic basis, i.e. conditional independence, to interpret previous work on quantitative confirmation theory. It substantially resolves the "taxethemorleavethem" problem of priors: MYCIN had to leave them out, while PROSPECTOR had to have them in. It recasts some of confirmation theory's advantages in terms of the psychological accessibility of probabilistic information in different (transformed) formats. Finally, it helps to unify the representation of uncertain reasoning (see also [11]).
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