
Cyber attacks with bounded sensor reading edits for partiallyobserved discrete event systems
The problem of cyber attacks with bounded sensor reading edits for parti...
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Synthesis of Winning Attacks on Communication Protocols using Supervisory Control Theory
There is an increasing need to study the vulnerability of communication ...
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A framework for the analysis of supervised discrete event systems under attack
This paper focuses on the problem of cyber attacks for discrete event sy...
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Lowcost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub1/3 stakeholders
We outline two dishonest strategies that can be cheaply executed on the ...
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Deciding Detectability for Labeled Petri Nets
Detectability of discrete event systems (DESs) is a property to determin...
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A unified concurrentcomposition method to state/event inference and concealment in discreteevent systems
Discreteevent systems usually consist of discrete states and transition...
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More Tolerant Reconstructed Networks by SelfHealing against Attacks in Saving Resource
Complex network infrastructure systems for powersupply, communication, ...
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Error and TamperTolerant State Estimation for Discrete Event Systems under Cost Constraints
This paper deals with the state estimation problem in discreteevent systems modeled with nondeterministic finite automata, partially observed via a sensor measuring unit whose measurements (reported observations) may be vitiated by a malicious attacker. The attacks considered in this paper include arbitrary deletions, insertions, or substitutions of observed symbols by taking into account a bounded number of attacks or, more generally, a total cost constraint (assuming that each deletion, insertion, or substitution bears a positive cost to the attacker). An efficient approach is proposed to describe possible sequences of observations that match the one received by the measuring unit, as well as their corresponding state estimates and associated total costs. We develop an algorithm to obtain the leastcost matching sequences by reconstructing only a finite number of possible sequences, which we subsequently use to efficiently perform state estimation. We also develop a technique for verifying tampertolerant diagnosability under attacks that involve a bounded number of deletions, insertions, and substitutions (or, more generally, under attacks of bounded total cost) by using a novel structure obtained by attaching attacks and costs to the original plant. The overall construction and verification procedure have complexity that is of O(X^2 C^2),where X is the number of states of the given finite automaton and C is the maximum total cost that is allowed for all the deletions, insertions, and substitutions. We determine the minimum value of C such that the attacker can coordinate its tampering action to keep the observer indefinitely confused while utilizing a finite number of attacks. Several examples are presented to demonstrate the proposed methods.
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