
Schelling Games on Graphs
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of re...
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Modified Schelling Games
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are di...
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The Complexity of Sequential Routing Games
We study routing games where every agent sequentially decides her next e...
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The Flip Schelling Process on Random Geometric and ErdösRényi Graphs
Schelling's classical segregation model gives a coherent explanation for...
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Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different type...
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Computational Aspects of Equilibria in Discrete Preference Games
We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preferenc...
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Graphical Economies with Resale
Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (KKO) introduce a graphtheoretic generalizati...
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Equilibria in Schelling Games: Computational Complexity and Robustness
In the simplest gametheoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph such as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied neighborhood. Two ways of modeling agent movement here are either to allow two agents to swap their vertices or to allow an agent to jump to a free vertex. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we prove that deciding the existence of a swapequilibrium and a jumpequilibrium in this simplest model of Schelling games is NPhard, thereby answering questions left open by Agarwal et al. [AAAI '20] and Elkind et al. [IJCAI '19]. Second, we introduce a measure for the robustness of equilibria in Schelling games in terms of the minimum number of edges that need to be deleted to make an equilibrium unstable. We prove tight lower and upper bounds on the robustness of swapequilibria in Schelling games on different graph classes.
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