Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

06/07/2021

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We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an ϵ-equilibrium, for every ϵ > 0.

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Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

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