End-to-End Multi-Tab Website Fingerprinting Attack: A Detection Perspective
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Website fingerprinting attack (WFA) aims to deanonymize the website a user is visiting through anonymous networks channels (e.g., Tor). Despite of remarkable progress in the past years, most existing methods make implicitly a couple of artificial assumptions that (1) only a single website (i.e., single-tab) is visited each time, and (2) website fingerprinting data are pre-trimmed into a single trace per website manually. In reality, a user often open multiple tabs for multiple websites spontaneously. Indeed, this multi-tab WFA (MT-WFA) setting has been studied in a few recent works, but all of them still fail to fully respect the real-world situations. In particular, the overlapping challenge between website fingerprinting has never been investigated in depth. In this work, we redefine the problem of MT-WFA as detecting multiple monitored traces, given a natural untrimmed traffic data including monitored traces, unmonitored traces, and potentially unconstrained overlapping between them. This eliminates the above assumptions, going beyond the conventional single website fingerprint classification perspective taken by all previous WFA methods. To tackle this realistic MT-WFA problem, we formulate a novel Website Fingerprint Detection (WFD) model capable of detecting accurately the start and end points of all the monitored traces and classifying them jointly, given long, untrimmed raw traffic data. WFD is end-to-end, with the trace localization and website classification integrated in a single unified pipeline. To enable quantitative evaluation in our MT-WFA setting, we introduce new performance metrics. Extensive experiments on several newly constructed benchmarks show that our WFD outperforms the state-of-the-art alternative methods in both accuracy and efficiency by a large margin, even with a very small training set. Code is available at https://github.com/WFDetector/WFDetection
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