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Egalitarian Judgment Aggregation

by   Sirin Botan, et al.

Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance with respect to gender or ethnicity in committee elections. Yet, the egalitarian approach has received little attention in judgment aggregation – a powerful framework for aggregating logically interconnected issues. We make the first steps towards filling that gap. We introduce axioms capturing two classical interpretations of egalitarianism in judgment aggregation and situate these within the context of existing axioms in the pertinent framework of belief merging. We then explore the relationship between these axioms and several notions of strategyproofness from social choice theory at large. Finally, a novel egalitarian judgment aggregation rule stems from our analysis; we present complexity results concerning both outcome determination and strategic manipulation for that rule.


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