Dynamic information design

05/13/2020
by   Deepanshu Vasal, et al.
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We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this signal, the receiver takes an action that determines rewards for both the sender and the receiver and controls the state of the system. In this technical note, we show that this problem can be considered as a problem of dynamic game of asymmetric information and its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) can be analyzed using the algorithms presented in [1], [2] by the same author (among others). We then extend this model when there is one sender and multiple receivers and provide algorithms to compute a class of equilibria of this game.

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