Dynamic Combinatorial Assignment

03/24/2023
by   Thanh Nguyen, et al.
0

We study a model of dynamic combinatorial assignment of indivisible objects without money. We introduce a new solution concept called “dynamic approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes” (DACEEI), which stipulates that markets must approximately clear in almost all time periods. A naive repeated application of approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (Budish, 2011) does not yield a desirable outcome because the approximation error in market-clearing compounds quickly over time. We therefore develop a new version of the static approximate competitive equilibrium from carefully constructed random budgets which ensures that, in expectation, markets clear exactly. We then use it to design the “online combinatorial assignment mechanism” (OCAM) which implements a DACEEI with high probability. The OCAM is (i) group-strategyproof up to one object (ii) envy-free up to one object for almost all agents (iii) approximately market-clearing in almost all periods with high probability when the market is large and arrivals are random. Applications include refugee resettlement, daycare assignment, and airport slot allocation.

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