Duty to Warn in Strategic Games

11/08/2019
by   Pavel Naumov, et al.
0

The paper investigates the second-order blameworthiness or duty to warn modality "one coalition knew how another coalition could have prevented an outcome". The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the distributed knowledge and the duty to warn modalities.

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