Distortion in Social Choice Problems: The First 15 Years and Beyond

by   Elliot Anshelevich, et al.

The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency – typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents – due to having access only to limited information about the preferences of the agents. We survey the most significant results of the literature on distortion from the past 15 years, and highlight important open problems and the most promising avenues of ongoing and future work.


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A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferen...

Don't Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond

In most social choice settings, the participating agents are typically r...

Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries

Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is...

On the Randomized Metric Distortion Conjecture

In the single winner determination problem, we have n voters and m candi...

Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice

We study efficiency in general collective choice problems when agents ha...

Social Choice Optimization

Social choice is the theory about collective decision towards social wel...

Some Open Problems related to Creative Telescoping

Creative telescoping is the method of choice for obtaining information a...