Differential Game Analysis for Cooperation Models in Automotive Supply Chain under Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Policies
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In the context of reducing carbon emissions in the automotive supply chain, collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and retailers has proven to be an effective measure for enhancing carbon emission reduction within the enterprise. This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of such collaboration by constructing a differential game model that incorporates carbon trading and consumer preferences for low-carbon products. The model examines the decision-making process of an automotive supply chain comprising a vehicle manufacturer and multiple retailers. By utilizing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we analyze the equilibrium strategies of the participants under both a decentralized model and a Stackelberg leader-follower game model. In the decentralized model, the vehicle manufacturer optimizes its carbon emission reduction efforts, while each retailer independently determines its low-carbon promotion efforts and vehicle retail price. In the Stackelberg leader-follower game model, the vehicle manufacturer cooperates with the retailers by offering them a subsidy. Consequently, the manufacturer plays as the leader, making decisions on carbon emission reduction efforts and the subsidy rate, while the retailers, as followers, compute their promotion efforts and retail prices accordingly. Through theoretical analysis and numerical experiments considering the manufacturer's and retailers' efforts, the low-carbon reputation of vehicles, and the overall system profits under both models, we conclude that compared to the decentralized model, where each party pursues individual profits, the collaboration in the Stackelberg game yields greater benefits for both parties. Furthermore, this collaborative approach promotes the long-term development of the automotive supply chain.
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